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Observers both within and outside of Colombia are challenged to understand
the nature of the current crisis in the country. That crisis is characterized by
weakened state institutions, loss of effective state control over vast, though remote,
areas of the country, and intense violence -generated by drug traffickers, guerrillas,
the military and the police, shadowy death squads, and common criminals, with some
12,000 to 16,000 Colombians meeting violent deaths for each of the past several
years. Paradoxically, and in contrast to much of the rest of the continent, the
Colombian economy has remained comparatively healthy. And, the current
administration of President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) has unimpeachable
democratic credentials and appears to be striving sincerely to confront the country's
violence and polarization with measures of institutionalization and reform.
A central element in understanding the nature of Colombia's contemporary
crisis, is the core topic of this book: drug trafficking (1). Some past Colombian
economic bonanzas have been associated with a degree of violence and have
generated massive accumulations of capital largely outside of state control. Yet, drug
trafficking would appear to have several distinctive features: its illegality both
domestically and internationally, which is central to explaining the astonishing profit
margins and the international pressures it generates; the extent to which tactics not
only of corruption and intimidation but of violence are employed against central state
agents as well as others in society; the remarkably small volume of the product
(particularly of cocaine) that is involved and the degree of concentration of benefits
generated by the lucrative trade. Also noteworthy is the ability of drug traffickers to
combine rudimentary methods with some of the most sophisticated technologies,
especially in transportation and communications.
This paper focuses on the impact of drug trafficking on Colombian democracy
by examining its effects in Colombian society, and on the state and the regime.
Several of the difficulties of specifying this impact are so apparent that one almost
hesitates to mention them. Hard data are often absent, estimates vary widely, and
patterns can shift as methods and relationships among trafficking groups, state
agents, local producers and other actors can all change quickly. Even if the analysis
is correct, it may be about a situation that is no longer present. Furthermore, it is
critical to understand the interactive effects between drug traffickers and different
societal groups, domestically or internationally. In addition, when facts are obscure or
obscured, perceptions -of revenues generated, the degree of power of drug
traffickers, the extent and nature of links between them and guerrilla groups, their
penetration of political parties, the intent and validity of actions by the United States,
and so on- take on added meaning.
If disentangling "drug trafficking" is difficult, complications also revolve around
the concept of "democracy". The Colombian political regime established in 1958 may
be unproblematically characterized as a "democracy" by politicians, diplomats and
policy-makers, but its categorization has never been simple for analysts. As it finally
emerged following approval of a 1957 constitutional plebiscite and a 1959
constitutional reform, the National Front agreement between the country's dominant
political parties, the Conservative (now Social Conservative) and Liberal, stipulated
that from 1958 to 1974 the presidency would alternate between members of the two
parties, and that all cabinet offices, legislative and judicial posts and other
government jobs not covered by civil service were to be divided equally between the
two parties. In addition, most measures would require a two-thirds vote in Congress
for approval. A 1968 Constitutional Reform was only able to program a partial
dismantling of the agreement. The Reform reinstituted a simple majority vote rather
than by two-thirds in Congress. It also opened elections to all parties and eliminated
parity in the legislative branch at the municipal and departmental level in 1970 and at
the national level in 1974. Competitive presidential elections were held in 1974,
although parity in the cabinet and public employment was extended until 1978. From
1978 on, the majority party has been required to offer "adequate and equitable"
representation in the executive branch to the party receiving the second highest
number of votes in the elections. From 1958 to 1986, when Conservatives refused
participation in the newly inaugurated government of Liberal Virgilio Barco (1986-
1990), Colombia had a political regime based on coalition rule (2).
Because of the sharp restrictions on majoritarian democratic practices
imposed by the National Front agreement and because the country has been
governed for most of the time since the late 1940s under a state of siege, most
analysts have viewed Colombia since 1958 as a qualified democracy, using
adjectives such as "controlled", "oligarchical", or "restricted" (3). Others have
characterized the country from the other side of the dernocracy authoritarianism
continuum as "inclusionary authoritarian" or as "in-between these two", in a lengthy,
30-year transition from dictatorship to democratic government, accelerated by
democratic reforms enacted in the mid-1980s (4).
In my view, the best characterization of the contemporary Colombian political
regime is that is has been a limited democratic consociational regime, currently in an
uncertain process of transformation. It has been "consociational" because a return to
civilian rule in 1958 was difficult to conceive without the extensive mutual guarantees
between the two major parties embodied in the National Front agreement (5). Yet,
the rigid consociational practices (relaxed in the post-1974 period and now in a
further process of dismantling), combined with other restrictions, have limited the
regime's democratic nature. In the 1980s, what has been increasingly at issue is not
only whether the regime is able to transform itself in a more fully democratic direction,
but whether the state can regain coherence and capacity to act. (6)
Two arguments, discussed in the next section, flow from these considerations.
One is that Colombia would have had serious political turmoil in the 1980s even
without the violence and corruption generated by drug trafficking, including problems
with guerrilla violence and with the efficacy of the country's judicial branch. Another is
that this turmoil has been associated with efforts to redefine the political "rules of the
game" of the Colombian political regime established in 1958, attempting to move the
regime from a consociationalism no longer necessary to prevent inter-party violence
toward a more competitive, more participatory and more responsive direction. In
studying the impact of drug trafficking on Colombian democracy, then, one must
examine its impact on society, on state structures and on political institutions, as well
as on the efforts to reform, expand and modify these structures and institutions.
The second section below examines the evolution of drug trafficking in
Colombia in recent decades, providing estimates of its magnitude and emphasizing
its impact on Colombian society in the 1970s. The third section then reviews the
negative impact of drug trafficking on Colombian societal groups and institutions, on
state structures and on the political regime and institutions and on the efforts to
reform them (7). The fragmentary evidence available suggests that the leading drug
traffickers did not begin with a "political project" of their own, though their activities
through the 1980s have led them increasingly to identify with anti-democratic rightist
elements. Drug traffickers have desired to protect by whatever means necessary
their ability to continue living in the country, while expanding their trafficking
enterprises and enjoying their newly-purchased businesses and landed estates. They
have also sought to possess a degree of social acceptance. This has led them, in
response to state efforts to inhibit their activities, to form temporary alliances with a
wide variety of actors and to ruthless tactics of assassination, violence and
intimidation. These actions have helped to disarticulate efforts to reform the regime
and have also further weakened the state, generating an environment in which other
kinds of violence may also flourish. Other negative consequences, particularly in the
late 1980s, include inhibiting effects on the mass media, concentration of land
holdings, and, more speculatively, population-wide declines in trust and social and
institutional solidarity and increases in cynicism and resentment by some and moral
outrage by others, affecting regime legitimacy.
The negative effects of drug trafficking on democracy, with regard to society,
the state and the regime are undeniable. Yet, as will also be explored in this section,
poorly-crafted international pressure and incomplete state efforts to combat drug
trafficking may threaten democracy as seriously as the phenomenon of drug
trafficking itself. The former may help spawn a nationalist attitude that may be
tolerant or even pro-narcotics, while the latter may help both demonstrate and
accelerate state weakness, endanger the viability of the armed forces as an
institution or strengthen support for guerrilla movements in rural areas where crop
eradication efforts are undertaken. For these reasons, it is not surprising that bitter
disagreements regarding the distribution of costs in the struggle against drug
trafficking have emerged between Colombia and the United States and that calls for
consideration of legalization as an option that should be seriously considered
continue to emerge (8).
DEMOCRACY, COALITION RULE AND POLITICAL TURMOIL
The current focus on the impact of drug trafficking in Colombia has led some,
particularly certain U.S. policymakers, to gloss over complex features of Colombian
politics (9). However, Colombia probably would have experienced political turmoil in
the 1980s even without the additional violence, corruption and other social and
economic effects of drug trafficking. The political model of coalition rule established in
1958 between the two traditional parties was in apparent need of redefinition and
reaccommodation in the 1970s.
From the 19th century, Colombia inherited its two deeply entrenched parties
(which divided the country politically while helping to integrate it nationally), strong
regionalism, occasionally pandemic violence and a weak state and military. Indeed,
Colombia has a long record of civilian, republican rule, punctuated by interludes of
intense civil wars which on a number of occasions were resolved by inter-party
accommodation (10). The last of these was known simply as la violencia (the
violence). It began as local-level violence following the victory of the minority
Conservative presidential candidate in 1946 aided by a split in the Liberal party, and
then accelerated following the April 1948 bogotazo -rioting and demonstrations that
erupted in Bogotá following the assassination of the Liberal populist leader Jorge
Eliécer Gaitán and that spread to other cities.
The complex period ushered in by these events led to an estimated 200,000
casualties, a breakdown of the country's oligarchical democracy, a military coup and
eventually negotiations between leaders of the two political parties to re-establish
civilian rule (11). Given the immediate past history of intense violence between party
faithful, a return to civilian rule without extensive mutual guarantees appeared
inconceivable. At the same time, the consociational National Front regime was an
elite response to a perceived crisis stemming from the fear of exclusion from power
by a military government, potential revolutionary violence in the countryside and
economic stagnation (12).
From 1958 to 1986, this political framework of two-party coalition rule
accommodated vast social and economic change. The nature and functioning of
coalition politics played a major role in explaining both the country's comparatively
favorable economic performance during this period as well as its increasing problems
in consolidating legitimate democratic rule. After thirty years, the country was
transformed socially, economically and demographically with little political. change.
The country's population doubled, and it became far younger, better educated, and
more urban. Population growth rates declined dramatically over this period and
industrialization advanced, though income distribution patterns, always terribly
unequal, did not improve dramatically (if at all). These socioeconomic changes,
combined with the National Front agreement itself -which twice asked voters of one
party to elect a president from another- helped dismantle the sectarian party
identifications which had spawned the violence of the late 1940s and 1950s and had
been viewed as requiring the inter-party agreements that followed shortly thereafter,
A floating electorate potentially mobilizable by different parties or movements began
to emerge, especially in urban areas.
During the National Front period there was an important expansion in the
technical capacities of the state, particularly with regard to the ability to monitor and
process information. State capacity to intervene in and control the economy
appeared to increase during this period, particularly during certain presidential
administrations. However, the state presence in many remote areas of the country
remained small as did its ability to control smuggling or contraband activities. Central
state control and efficiency were also threatened by clientelism and by the
consolidation of radical public sector unions in the face of low pay and poor working
conditions. Viewed as interventionist, inefficient, even labyrinthine by the business
sector, the Colombian state would nevertheless have to be considered a weak one
even prior to the onslaught by drug traffickers.
The fear of sectarianism and a return to partisan violence continued to serve
as the excuse for the need to sustain a political regime based on coalition rule long
after it was really necessary. Coalition rule generated powerful incentives
encouraging politicians of both parties to seek its continuance, even as it generally
favored powerful economic interests. Access to patronage and brokerage was
insured by coalition and viewed as essential given an electoral system of proportional
representation, multiple party lists for legislative posts and high abstention. However,
this also fostered further party factionalism and the parties became dominated
increasingly by regional politicians in control of small captive electorates, with few
links to mass organizations. The structuring of majority coalitions in Congress
involved extensive issue-by-issue negotiations and the promise of short-term
benefits. Furthermore, the parties largely failed to develop new organizations or
methods to appeal to the country's growing urban population even as their
penetration into rural areas was not very deep. Ironically, with the collapse of the
populist ANAPO (National Popular Alliance) movement following the 1970 elections
and with a return, to competitive elections during the decade, this made it more
difficult for opposition parties to gain electoral representation even as the traditional
parties were increasingly incapable of channelling dissent (13).
In this context, in the 1970s non-electoral opposition emerged or was
strengthened. Labor organizations independent from the traditional parties and the
regime gained in strength, especially in the public sector and in manufacturing, even
as the increasingly weaker traditional labor confederations also distanced themselves
from the regime. In 1977, there was an unprecedented National Civic Strike
supported by nearly all labor confederations. The sharp rise of civic movements and
protests in the 1970s further reflected the economic. frustration of urban groups,
especially in smaller cities, and the declining role of the traditional parties as effective
intermediaries. And, the 1970s also witnessed the growing strength of guerrilla
groups. In addition to the guerrilla groups that emerged radicalized from the period of
la violencia (principally, the FARC), and those that emerged in the 1960s (the
Castroite-influenced ELN and the Maoist EPL), in 1972 the M-19 was established by
figures from the FARC and the Communist Party and radicalized elements of the
populist ANAPO (National Populist Alliance) (14). From stealing Simón Bolívar's
sword from its museum display case in April 1974, the M-19 shifted to kidnappings
and other often spectacular urban actions (such as the take-over of the Dominican
Embassy with 14 ambassadors hostage in February 1980) before shifting to a rural
strategy later in 1980. At the same time, the Colombian armed forces, less imbued
with traditional partisan identifications than in the past, were becoming a more
corporate, autonomous and professionalized body.
National political leaders recognized the need for political reform in order to
revitalize the regime, but they met resistance from regional politicians and
entrenched institutional and economic interests, as well as skepticism from groups
seeking more radical changes. President Alfonso López (1974-1978) sought to
establish a Constitutional Assembly in 1978 that was intended to carry out changes
in two areas. One was a decentralization of the country's administrative structure,
financially strengthening the departments and municipalities. The expectation was
that this could encourage a more normal political process of government-opposition
by reducing the country's suffocating centralization that led most politicians to want
to participate in the executive, even as it could also reduce political irresponsibility at
the local level as the central government would no longer be financially liable for
local programs. Another was an overhaul of the country's archaic and increasingly
inoperative civilian judicial system that had not expanded sufficiently with respect to
the country's growing population and had not modernized its facilities, equipment or
procedures. Underpaid jueces de instrucción (investigating magistrates) were
overwhelmed by massive caseloads in which they were expected to compile
evidence and determine if an accused should go to trial. The judicial system was
perceived as easily subverted both by guerrillas and by the emerging drug traffickers
(15). The proposal for the Assembly, though, was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court and an important opportunity for political reform was lost (16).
In sum, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, political turmoil, dissent expressed
outside of partisan political channels, factionalism and organizational weakness of
the traditional political parties, serious flaws in the judicial system and guerrilla
violence were all accelerating problems. And, these would have been problems
independent of the serious complications generated by the growing influence of drug
revenues and drug traffickers and the increased pressure by the United States on the
Colombian state to address the issue.
This does not mean that the Colombian regime suffered a "birth defect" as a
consequence of the pacts that established it. Nor does it mean that the crisis
-including the massive turn to violence throughout society, the collapse of the
judiciary and the challenge to other state institutions- was in any sense inevitable due
to the constraining features of the National Front or the changes generated within
Colombian society over the past thirty years. The transformation of the regime would
almost certainly have been traumatic, uneven and perhaps even sporadically violent.
Yet, drug trafficking, by its de-institutionalizing impact on the state, its demoralizing
effects on the regime, its, diverse temporary alliances and its impact on a wide
variety of other social processes, combined with the consequences of the attempted
response to it, has helped provoke a more generalized crisis of state authority and a
wave of violence whose consequences and whose termination are not clearly in sight
(17).
THE GROWTH AND INITIAL EFFECTS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
Drug trafficking emerged as a major economic phenomenon in Colombia in
the mid-1970s. At first, it was largely not distinguished from multiple other illegal or
questionable economic activities in the country, even as some of its effects -such as
the generation of foreign exchange or of employment- were often viewed positively.
Although the cultivation of marihuana probably began expanding in Colombia
in the mid-to-late 1960s, the Colombian marihuana "boom" did not occur until the
mid-1970s. Until 1975, when the Mexican government began seriously eradicating
crops, Mexican producers dominated the U.S. market. Estimates of the value of
marihuana exports vary tremendously. One 1979 study estimated that US$1,400
million dollars entered the Colombian economy in 1978 as a result of marihuana
exports, of which US$165 million came in through the central bank and the rest
through other means (18) Yet, other estimates place the value of marihuana exports
during this peak period much lower. A recent publication, based primarily on U.S.
government estimates, places the foreign exchange value during the 1977-1981
period at no more than US$250 million in any given year; not an insignificant
amount, but only 18 percent of the earlier figure. This same source cites Colombia
as supplying 52 percent of the United States marihuana market in 1977, a figure that
climbed steadily to 79 percent in 1981 after which it began to decline, first as a
consequence of a serious drought and then because of consumers switching to
varieties produced elsewhere and eradication measures by the Colombian
government. By 1985, Colombia was supplying only 22 percent of the U.S.
marihuana market, which itself had shrunk from an annual consumption of some
10,000 tons in earlier years to around 8,000 tons (19). To place these figures in
perspective, it should be noted that the late 1970s was also a period of an incredible
coffee boom in the country. Recorded coffee exports grew from US$680.5 million in
1975, to US$996.0 million in 1976, to US$1,512.6 million in 1977 and to US$2,026.8
million in 1978, even as coffee contraband may well have expanded during this
period (estimated by the Colombian Coffee Federation at US$184 million in 1976
and US$135 million in 1977).
Marihuana came to be cultivated primarily along the Atlantic Coast. The
relatively unpopulated Guajira Peninsula had been a center for smuggling for
centuries. Estimates of the hectares planted in marihuana during the peak period of
the 1970s also vary widely from 7,000-9,000 hectares to around 19,000 hectares
(20), and estimates of employment generated by the cultivation thus also oscillate
widely. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the massive influx of
money generated by the coffee and marihuana exports in the mid -to late- 1970s
(and to a lesser extent, cocaine shipments) helped fuel regional bonanzas. One
indicator was localized real estate booms that drove housing prices on the Atlantic
Coast to levels higher than those in Bogotá in the late 1970s, before declining
around 1980, when they began to escalate in Medellín, center of the cocaine traffic;
another is the rise and decline of real rural wage rates on the Atlantic Coast during
this period.
The revenues I generated by these activities helped fuel a growing
"underground economy", which appears to have taken added importance due to
government policies dedicated to financial liberalization and then to controlling the
inflationary consequences of the legal coffee boom. The official exchange rate was
effectively revalued and the black market dollar exchange rate actually fell below it,
apparently serving as a powerful incentive for the smuggling of textiles and other
consumer goods into the country. Combined with high interest rates, this helped
spark an industrial recession. The call by the financial interest group ANIF for the
legalization of marihuana appears related to concerns about the "assault on
respectable stock companies" by the "underground economy" to which industrial
firms increasingly turned for loans (21). Government deregulation of the now
burgeoning financial sector, increased vulnerability of different industries,
questionable loans of a number of banks to associated conglomerate firms and
perhaps narcotics seizures in the United States all helped spark a crisis in the
country's financial sector that erupted in 1982 during the final weeks of the Turbay
administration (22).
The marihuana boom was at least partially accepted by the Colombian
government even as it appeared to benefit already powerful land-owning families as
well as generate substantial new wealth and selected upward mobility. It benefited a
region, the Atlantic Coast, that had always felt somewhat removed from and
discriminated against by the country's Andean center. Prior to a visit to the United
States in 1975, then President López Michelsen asserted that Colombia "is a victim
of its privileged geographic position" (23). However, confronted with pervasive
corruption in law enforcement agencies (especially DAS, the security police), he
changed personnel seeking to curtail, if not uproot, the problem. And in 1977, in the
face of continuing U.S. pressure, López took other steps particularly against cocaine,
including the reorganization of the judicial police as an anti-narcotics force (24).
Even before Colombia's marihuana exports began their decline, however,
cocaine trafficking, center in Medellín, overshadowed it. As U.S. demand for cocaine
increased in the 1970s, Colombian traffickers increased their efforts to meet that
demand. By the spring 1976, the United Nations had recognized Colombia as the
center of the world cocaine traffic (25). As exports grew, the transportation of cocaine
shifted from individual carriers or "mules" (whether on commercial airliners or ships)
to private airplanes. And in the 1978-1981 period, the "Medellín drug bosses turned
their attention to gaining control of wholesale distribution in the United States". A few
years later, major Medellín drug figures, such as Pablo Escobar and Jorge Ochoa,
were being listed among the wealthiest individuals in the world by Forbes (26).
Estimates of the value of cocaine trafficking to Colombia vary even more
widely than do those of marihuana. The challenge is not only to determine the "costs"
(including the extent to which coca base is brought in from Bolivia and Peru), the
actual extent of exports and what percentage are seized or otherwise lost, but also
how deeply into the U.S. wholesale (and retail) markets do the major Colombian
traffickers extend and what percentage of the dollars generated are actually
repatriated back to Colombia. Assuming a 50 percent penetration of U.S. wholesale
markets, Gómez estimates that the value of cocaine trafficking for Colombia peaked
in 1982 at US$2,191 million, declining to US$760 minion in 1985 (with total tons of
cocaine exported ranging from 50 to 100, depending on the year). The total
contribution of marihuana and cocaine trafficking to the Colombian economy, then,
also peaked in 1982 at 6.07 percent of GDP, declining to 2.36 percent in 1985.
Although he does not provide precise figures, Gómez estimates that with the growth
of cocaine exports to European markets (to around 30 tons), in 1988 the net income
for Colombia due to drug trafficking may have been around US$1,200 million.
Caballero, based on much higher estimates of the total tons of cocaine exported to
the United States and to Europe (270 tons to the United States and 40 tons to
Europe), estimates net income to Colombian traffickers in 1988 at US$4,000 million,
of which he asserts probably no more than US$1,000 million returned to Colombia.
He also notes the number of hectares of coca grown in Colombia appears to have
expanded from marginal amounts at the beginning of the decade to anywhere from
10,000 to 25,000 hectares in 1988. Thus, it is quite conceivable that in the late 1980s
there were more hectares of coca in cultivation than there were of marihuana at its
peak nearly a decade earlier. Bagley, in turn, estimates revenues derived by
Colombia by the trafficking in both drugs at around US$1,500 million in 1980, rising
to US$2,500 million to US$3,000 million in 1985, where it remained for the rest of the
decade (27).
For the purposes of this paper, the vast differences in these estimates may
not matter that much. Even taking the lowest estimates, it is clear that we are talking
about vast sums of new money, much more than was involved with the marihuana
trade, heavily concentrated in the hands of very few people, though the expansion
of coca cultivation has brought larger numbers of people into the trade (28). The
main traffickers may have made the decision not to repatriate a substantial
percentage of their money, but in theory they could bring some or all of it back at a
later date if they so desired.
What were the social consequences of the eruption of this new wealth in
Colombia in the 1970s? During that decade, it became commonplace to refer to the
"emerging classes" (las clases emergentes), a phrase employed ambiguously in the
1978 presidential campaign. Julio César Turbay, the Liberal candidate, sought to
employ the term to refer to those who had previously been excluded from power,
whereas many, particularly elements of established wealth, viewed it as a
euphemism for the drug mafia or others who had gained wealth suddenly and
questionably (29). However, there was no perception that this was a qualitatively
different phenomenon than other activities that traditionally fueled the "underground
economy". The interaction of the many factors discussed here, including the
revenues generated by drug trafficking, government economic policy, and unrealized
expectations by urban middle and lower-sector groups generated by the sense the
country was experiencing an economic "boom" (in coffee) even as their own wages
deteriorated due to growing inflation, may all have exacerbated the nature of the
country's crisis even in the 1970s. Accusations of corruption may well have led to a
more cynical, relaxed attitude by some, even as it generated moral indignation and
repulsion by others (30).
DRUG TRAFFICKERS, SOCIETAL GROUPS, STATE INSTITUTIONS AND
POLITICAL STRUCTURES
It has been in the long decade since 1978 that the impact of drug trafficking
and the consequences of government efforts to constrain it have had their greatest
impact on the Colombian polity. Beginning with the Turbay administration, Colombian
governments have stepped up their eradication, interdiction and enforcement efforts,
though unevenly, and traffickers have responded to prevent their arrest, defend their
continuing trade, protect the enterprises and landed estates they have purchased
using drug profits and seek greater acceptance within society. How did trafficker
activities and the cycle of government action and trafficker reaction help provoke the
current situation of generalized violence, state weakness and perceived crisis?
The first intense actions against drug traffickers by the Colombian State were
taken during the Turbay administration. Shortly after coming into office in August
1978, Turbay enacted a tough Statute on Security which was employed against
guerrilla groups as well as drug traffickers. Negotiations also began for what became
the 1979 Treaty of Extradition between Colombia and the United States, which
permitted the extradition of nationals to the other country to face drug-related
charges (31). In late 1978, the Colombian armed forces were sent into La Guajira in
an aggressive effort to stem the flow of marihuana to the United States. Over the
nearly two year period, 6,000 tons of marihuana were seized as well as 300 aircraft
and boats. Yet, it would appear that the sharp decline in marihuana production
during this period was generated by other factors: a serious drought in 1982 and a
decline in the quality of Colombian marihuana even as U.S. growers were increasing
production and quality (32). Furthermore, the Colombian army completed a
withdrawal from La Guajira in mid-1980, to be replaced by a much smaller police
force. The army was never comfortable with the anti-drug effort, which it saw as
much more of a police function. It removed personnel and attention from what it saw
as the much more significant struggle against left-wing guerrillas. By early 1980, it
was also clear that the interdiction effort threatened to generate corruption within the
institution.
If drug traffickers felt challenged by stepped-up government enforcement
efforts and the extradition treaty, in November 1981 they discovered a threat from
another source. In that month, the daughter of Jorge Luis Ochoa, a major Medellín
trafficker, was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrillas who requested a $1 million ransom.
That event sparked the formation of the oldest of the current death squads, "Death to
Kidnappers" (MAS), and helped bring together various major traffickers into what has
become known as the Medellín Cartel (33). Notwithstanding this fact, the most
publicized connection -to come in 1984- was of a "narco-guerrilla" link. By this point,
Colombian societal groups and institutions, state structures, and political institutions
appeared increasingly affected or penetrated by drug traffickers, in ways that
increasingly threatened the country's limited democracy and the efforts to reform it.
Societal groups and institutions. Some of the consequences of drug trafficking
on societal groups have had a direct, negative impact on democracy. The most
immediate and obvious is by its promotion of violence. Drug traffickers have killed
peasants, laborers, guerrillas, newspapermen, social and political activists, police
and military, criminal investigators and judges, cabinet ministers and other high
government officials. They have done so with impunity. And, they have encouraged
others to do the same, sometimes directly by providing them with sophisticated
weapons or personnel, and other times, indirectly, by example. They have helped to
foster a context of violence so severe that sicarios, individuals willing to kill for a fee,
have emerged in numbers and with a brazenness that distinguish them from similar
phenomena from Colombia's past. The collapse of state authority or respect for the
rule of law have fueled diverse patterns of violence, with different goals and
orientations, throughout the country (34).
Drug traffickers have also had a "chilling effect" on the media in Colombia.
Targeted assassinations of reporters and editors include those of Raúl Echavarría
Barrientos, assistant director of "Occidente" in September 1986 or of Guillermo Cano
Isaza, director of "El Espectador" in December of that year. Yet, their impact on the
media has been more generalized, as they have helped foster an environment of fear
leading some journalists to flee the country and others to impose varying degrees of
self-censorship.
No relationship of drug trafficking with societal groups has been more
publicized, and just as often challenged, than the " narco-guerrilla" linkage. To the
extent the police and the military are seeking to destroy traffickers or the coca crops
they have promoted, traffickers share a common enemy with the guerrillas. To the
extent the struggle against drug traffic or leading traffickers diverts resources or
attention from the guerrilla struggle or leads traffickers to react in ways that further
weaken the state presence in certain areas, the guerrillas may be assisted. And the
nationalist, "anti-imperialist" rhetoric of drug traffickers fighting the extradition treaty
resonated with nationalist strands of public opinion that resented U.S. pressures and
the degeneration of Colombia's image around the world. All the guerrilla groups
opposed the extradition treaty on nationalist grounds.
There were also more concrete reasons for linkages between drug traffickers
and guerrilla groups. Through the 1980s, the cultivation of coca expanded into
newly-colonized, remote areas of the country, where various fronts of different
guerrilla groups, principally the FARC, have been operating. Yet, it is now not even
clear that FARC guerrillas were protecting the Yarí river cocaine complex occupied in
March 1984, as initially alleged. Subsequently, however indicating how rapidly
circumstances may evolve, it appears the FARC provided protection for cocaine
laboratories, and may well have established some of its own. State destruction of
coca plots, especially without adequate provision for alternative crops and the means
to get them to market, is made much more difficult by these facts. Yet, rather than
some "FARC-narc" connection, it might be more accurate to view the FARC as
having served as "an armed trade union for Colombia's coca campesinos" (35), with
an incipient interest in the late 1980s in production and marketing of cocaine directly
itself, When cocaine prices were higher in the mid-1980s, accommodation among
traffickers, peasants and the FARC may have been easier and profits could be
generated for all three. However, in time, the tension between traffickers and the
FARC appears to have grown, whether due to higher "taxes" charged by the FARC,
lower world cocaine prices, FARC interest in direct marketing of the drug, or some
combination of these factors. That tension appears to have played a role in the
October 1987 assassination of Jaime Pardo L,eal, the presidential candidate of the
UP in the 1986 elections. Regional points of collaboration may well still continue,
even as the FARC may operate some cocaine laboratories, but the notion of an
alliance is untenable.
In recent years, drug traffickers appear to have invested repatriated funds in
purchasing vast expanses of land in different regions of the country, including the
Magdalena Medio and Urabá. Supported on occasion by other landowners in the
region and by elements of the military, they have responded brutally to guerrilla
efforts to "tax" them and appear to have a hand in the massacres of union organizers
and activists (36). Although drug traffickers may not initially have had a clear "political
project" of their own, defense of their massive landed estates, the brutal
management of relations with peasant organizers and union leaders, and targeted
assassinations of leftist political leaders, increasingly place them on the
anti-democratic right. Democracy is further challenged by the fact that the
concentration of land ownership complicates even further the possibility of agrarian
reform.
Two other consequences of drug trafficking on Colombian society are evident.
One is a dramatic increase in the domestic consumption of drugs. In Medellín, e.g.,
the consumption of basuco grew dramatically in the early and mid-1980s (37).
Another could well be one of the more significant consequences, though it is difficult
to measure, that is the impact on values, on the extent, nature and durability of
cynicism, callousness to violence and distrust in everyday exchanges generated as a
form of self-protection in those regions of the country most affected by the growth of
drug trafficking and of violence (38).
State Institutions. The state institution which has been most seriously affected
by drug trafficking is almost certainly the judiciary. Over-worked, under-paid, with few
resources, many Colombian judges have pressed on with drug cases as their
consciences have dictated. Dozens of judges have been killed over the past 10 years
(39). These examples, and threats of assassination against individual judges or their
family members combined with promises of money have usually sufficed to insure
that large numbers of captured traffickers are not incarcerated or convicted. Many
others have successfully escaped from prison. Demoralization, corruption and
extortion, turn-over of personnel and other factors have led to an essential paralysis
of the judicial system.
Democratic reform or consolidation must build on the basis of a coherent
state. At a minimum, that requires rebuilding the judiciary and regaining basic respect
for the rule of law. In this period, though, the country's homicide rate has climbed
steadily as criminals have felt emboldened and their victims convinced they should
take justice into their own hands, further fueling the cycle. According to one study,
Colombia's homicide rate (per 100,000) fell from a high of 51.5 in 1958 to a low of
16.8 in both 1973 and 1975, steadily climbing to 30.2 in 1984 and then reaching 52.8
in 1987 (the U.S. rate in the early 1980s was around 11.3). The city with the most
homicides in the 1979-1986 period was Medellín, with 9,590 (an average of 1, 199
per year) (40). Some 85-90 percent of national homicides during this period were not
directly related to political, guerrilla or drug trafficking violence. However, the line
between "political" and "non-political" violence can be blurry; regional patterns of
polarized violence, "dirty war" massacres and disappearances have shown no sign of
abating; and the extent of criminal violence, in itself, has represented an independent
challenge to democratic norms. Few perpetrators have been captured or brought to
trial. And, in cities with high crime rates, as many as 80 percent of all crimes may go
unreported by a citizenry convinced it makes no difference.
Paradoxically, even as the capacity of the judiciary vis-a-vis society has
declined precipitously, it has gained a new assertiveness within the state. Tensions
between the judiciary and the executive had grown as a consequence of the
declarations of unconstitutionality of López's Constitutional Assembly and of a
Constitutional Reform approved under the Turbay administration (41). The judiciary
then changed jurisprudence with regard to powers of the executive to legislate
employing special powers such as the State of National Economic Emergency or
State of Siege (42). Tensions undoubtedly increased even more following the death
of 11 Supreme Courtjustices as President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) refused to
negotiate as the military proceeded with a bloody recovery of the Palace of Justice in
November 1985 following its take-over by M-19 guerrillas (a take-over funded, many
Colombian have been convinced, by drug traffickers, though evidence for this view
has been scarce).
The Barco administration suffered numerous setbacks from the courts.
Various measures sought by President Barco under state of siege powers, including
trials of civilians by military tribunals, emergency measures for the conflict-ridden
area of Urabá and the creation of a special tribunal which the government hoped to
employ to investigate political murders, were declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court (43). In 1988, an attempt to improve the administration of justice and
carry out other constitutional reforms by means of a referendum was found
unconstitutional. This emerging jurisprudence, beneficial from the perspective of
democratic theory seeking greater checks and balances among the various.
branches of government, has also constrained the strategy sought by the Barco
administration to respond to the country's deteriorating situation of violence.
If the effects of drug trafficking on the judiciary have been both clear and
dramatic, how their impact on another major state institution, the military, affects
democracy are much more controversial and uncertain. Continued guerrilla clashes,
regional conflicts and increased levels of violence have broadened the appeal of
simplistic authoritarian solutions, increased human rights violations on all sides and
inevitably widened the scope of autonomous action by the armed forces. As in much
of the rest of Latin America, the extent of institutionalized civilian governmental
oversight of military activities is limited and a fully democratic model of civil-military
relations does not exist.
The Colombian military have been fighting guerrilla groups since the 1950s,
and there is little question they see these groups as the primary national security
challenge. The experience in La Guajira apparently made at least some military wary
of the distracting fight against drug trafficking. At the same time, however, blows
against drug traffickers in Colombia by the military and police have occurred, and
they have incurred numerous casualties in this struggle. In August 1986, Colonel
Jaime Ramírez Gómez, who directed the March 1984 raid against a massive cocaine
complex on the Yarí River, was assassinated. In early and mid-1988, the Army
became more extensively involved in the fight against drug traffickers in the Medellín
area (44).
Yet, there is no reason to believe some elements of the armed forces would
not be tempted by the vast sums associated with drug trafficking. And as drug
traffickers have occasionally clashed with guerrilla groups or have targeted leftist
opposition groups or leaders, there is evidence that on some occasions they have
been assisted by elements of the police and the military as well as by retired
members of the security forces. President Betancur's Attorney General, Carlos
Jiménez Gómez, in an investigation of MAS ordered by the president, identified 56 of
163 members as either past or current members of the armed forces or the police
(45). Similar allegations surfaced following massacres of banana workers in the
region of Urabá (46) Investigations of this incident as well as of others by General
Maza of the DAS led to indictments as well as to forced retirements of several police
and military officers in early 1989, as well as to a failed assassination attempt on
Maza's life in May.
Indeed, the hubris of the leading drug traffickers in their attacks on the state is
perhaps most apparent in their targeting of high government officials. On April 30,
1984, Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara was assassinated on the orders of Medellín
traffickers. He had been unrelenting in his attacks on the presence of drug money in
political campaigns and investments in various businesses and sports clubs. But the
killing was probably precipitated by the March 1984 raid on the huge cocaine refining
complex on the Yarí River, in which 27,500 pounds of cocaine were seized. The
assassination provoked President Betancur to change his mind with regard to
implementation of the 1979 extradition treaty; he had initially rejected on nationalist
grounds the notion of sending Colombian citizens abroad to face criminal charges.
This was the moment -if there ever was a precise moment-when Colombians
determined they could no longer presume that the narcotics issue was essentially a
U.S. problem to be resolved by the United States (47).
The drug traffickers then sought to beat back the threat to them represented
by the extradition treaty. From their safe haven in Panama, where they had fled, they
attempted at first to negotiate with the Betancur administration. They talked first with
ex-President López in May 1984 and then with the Attorney General. In return for
immunity and a promise of no extradition, they promised to shut down their cocaine
business, to assist in crop substitution and drug rehabilitation and to repatriate their
vast wealth. However, there was simply no public support in Colombia for a deal with
the drug traffickers (48).
Few realized how unrelenting the traffickers would be in their determination to
protect themselves from extradition. The judge investigating the murder of Lara was
himself assassinated after he charged Pablo Escobar with being the intellectual
author of the crime; in July 1986, a Supreme Court Justice who had negotiated the
extradition treaty was assassinated. And a hit squad was sent to Hungary in January
1987 in a failed attempt to assassinate Lara's successor as Minister of Justice,
Enrique Parejo González, who had signed the extradition orders against leading
traffickers. Changes of police commanders in Medellín and elsewhere followed that
event, and, unexpectedly, Carlos Lehder Rivas, the most flamboyant of the Medellín
traffickers, was captured and immediately extradited to the United States in February
1987. And in January of the following year, the Conservative candidate for the
mayor's race in Bogota, Andrés Pastrana, was kidnapped by a group calling itself the
"Extraditables". Days later, Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was kidnapped
and then killed -near Medellín where he had flown to investigate the questionable
release of Jorge Ochoa in December; Pastrana was found unharmed that same day,
apparently by military sent to look for Mauro Hoyos.
The extradition treaty fell in a complex and judicially dubious process and
attempts to revive it as of mid-1989 were unsuccessful. In December 1986, the
Supreme Court declared the extradition treaty with the United States null and void
because it had not been signed by the President (who had been out of the country)
but by the cabinet minister who had been acting as president. In June 1987, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the effort of President Barco to sanction the
treaty by a new law following the first finding. And, efforts to employ an earlier treaty
as a basis for extradition were rejected in April and May 1988 by the Council of State
(49).
A “cost-benefit” analysis from a Colombian perspective, in retrospect, might
challenge the wisdom of refusing to negotiate With the. traffickers and of going. along
with the U.S. "supply-side" strategy. Over, the 1984-1988 period, Colombians
increasingly came to ask themselves why so many of their own, judges, law
enforcement officers, and. high government officials were being killed by drug
traffickers, in contrast to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, even as the
country gained increased notoriety internationally and confronted continuing pressure
from the United States. The brutal, and to date largely effective, counter-response to
state enforcement efforts further eroded judicial capacity, respect for the rule of law
and state legitimacy and presence. Rejecting "legalization" as an unrealistic option, it
is not surprising the Barco administration is calling for a more multilateral,
collaborative approach to the drug problem, At the same time, in early 1989 the
struggle against drug traffickers and criminal investigations of the death squads that
sometimes linked traffickers to members of the armed forces, continued, at great cost
to those directly involved.
Political Structures: The country's political structures have not been immune to
the impact of drug trafficking. The decentralized, factionalized nature of the political
parties, their reliance on clientelism and machine-style politics to get out the vote,
and the total absence of controls on campaign financing, all facilitated the entry of
drug money into the political process.
Access, influence, information, protection and opposition to the extradition
treaty, rather than a coherent ideological vision, appeared to be the principal
motivations. Allegations of campaigns fed in part by drug money emerged in the late
1970s on the Atlantic Coast, a region where vote-buying practices have been most
entrenched. Rumors of the presence of drug money in campaigns grew during the
1982 campaign. Pablo Escobar sought election to Congress on the lists of the
reformist Galanista "New Liberalism" faction (of which Rodrigo Lara was a leader);
however, Escobar was rejected because of his alleged drug connections. A separate
Liberal list was established, and Escobar gained election as an alternate to the
House of Representatives. He gained popular support in Medellín by donating money
to build low-income housing and by contributing to church-run charities. As Minister
of Justice, Lara led a campaign against Escobar, bringing his drug connections into
the open and forcing him to withdraw from politics (50).
More flamboyant were the actions of Carlos Lehder during this period. He
created his own political party, the Movimiento Cívico Latino Nacional (MCLN), and
through his newspaper Quindio Libre promoted views that were vaguely nationalist
and, somewhat fascist but clearly opposed to the extradition treaty. Subsequently,
from hiding, he threatened to support the M-19 while continuing to praise Hitler (51).
Yet, it has been with regard to efforts to incorporate guerrilla groups into the
political, process of the country that various direct and indirect consequences. of
activities by drug traffickers have had most effect. This paper cannot analyze in detail
President Betancur's efforts to seek "peace" with the guerrillas, and many factors
appear to have played a role in the failure of these efforts to stop the guerrilla
violence and successfully incorporate these groups into the democratic process (52) .
Among these would be divisions within the state, with the military questioning the
logic and appropriateness of various administration measures; an ambiguous
negotiating strategy on the part of the administration; lack of unity among the guerrilla
groups over whether to give up the goal of seeking state power; and, negative
short-term economic circumstances. Yet another would clearly have to be drug
trafficking: indirectly, by contributing to an atmosphere of violence and helping to
provoke the collapse of the judiciary or the capacity of the state to investigate crimes
successfully; directly, by its apparent targeting of left-wing political figures and social
activists, sometimes alone and sometimes in collaboration with others, such as
regional landowners or elements of the armed forces.
A central example has been the violence and intimidation of leaders and
activists of the leftist opposition party, Patriotic Unity (UP). The UP was formed by the
country's oldest and largest guerrilla group, the FARC, in March 1985 following the
truce established with the Betancur government in 1984. It was intended to
symbolize the willingness of the guerrilla organization to rejoin the political process
through electoral means. Unlike what occurred with other guerrilla organizations, the
truce between the Betancur government and the FARC was never formally broken.
However, as tensions built anew the FARC began to claim it was organizationally
distinct from the UP. The UP participated in the 1986 elections, winning a plurality or
a majority of the votes in over a dozen municipalities and 12 congressional seats
(including seats in coalition with Liberal party factions). From January 1986 to April
1988, 334 members of the UP and of popular organizations were assassinated,
including their presidential candidate for the 1986 elections, 4 congressmen, 2
mayors and 11 mayoral candidates (53).
Some of the violence in early 1988 revolved around the upcoming elections,
in which mayors were to be popularly elected for the first time. The popular election
of mayors (combined with limited measures of fiscal decentralization) was the most
important political reform approved during the Betancur administration. Joined with
the move away from coalition-rule as Barco sought to establish a
"government-opposition" system, it formed a key component of' policies to
reaccommodate the political regime, opening up the political process and seeking to
integrate guerrilla groups and other groups into peaceful, electoral forms of struggle.
Although election day was remarkably peaceful, the atmosphere of incredible
violence and targeted assassinations of political activists that surrounded the
elections unquestionably restricted their potential decentralizing, democratizing and
incorporating impact (54).
A self-reinforcing cycle of polarization appeared to be operating whereby UP
leaders, lacking trust with regard to their personal safety and the democratic process,
remained ambiguous with regard to the guerrilla option and the use of force; this in
turn, helped right-wing groups (whether drug traffickers, landowners or members of
the armed forces) to justify the use of the violence against them. Shadowy death
squads, of which some 140 were identified by the government, have taken
responsibility for many of the assassinations of UP activists and leaders. Over 1988
and 1989, they have also been involved in many larger-scale massacres. Given the
serious threat to democratic institutions and democratic values represented by the
violent alliances and actions of the country's major drug traffickers, primary
supporters of many of these death squads, the Barco administration has continued to
seek to stop their actions and bring them to justice. But, with a weak and penetrated
state, its few successes have at best been partial and incomplete.
As the Barco administration continues committed to the struggle against drug
traffickers and the violence they engender, other Colombian voices, some very
respectable, suggest that if temporary accommodation, even if tacit or almost
unintentional, is the price to pay to regain adequate judicial and institutional state
coherence, it may be worth it. Yet, given the emerging antidemocratic alliances that
are taking shape in part in reaction to past state efforts, it may be too late for such an
approach.
CONCLUSION
The temptation to comprehend Colombia by assimilating events there to
experiences in other countries, particularly by outside observers, is often great.
Potential future scenarios for the country around images of "Argentinization"
(repressive military rule) or "Salvadorization" (civil war), however, may play too great
a role in interpreting contemporary events (55). From the bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes of the Southern Cone, such as the ones Argentina experienced, comes the
notion that professional armed forces, influenced by an ideology of national security
and with direction and coordination from its top hierarchy, can carry out a brutal "dirty
war" of extermination not only against insurrectionary groups but even against other
individuals and organizations either perceived to be linked to them or viewed as
dangerous to "society" for other reasons. From Central America, the primary image
that is generated is that "restricted democracies" can exist in which a civilian facade
disguises what is almost complete military autonomy to act with total and brutal
impunity, either directly or through the formation of death squads that also can act
freely with little concern for retribution.
Although these images may be useful in discerning trends in the country that
could be magnified in the future, and their evocation may be part of a valid effort
seeking to mobilize opinion to prevent further deterioration of an intolerable situation
of political violence in the country, they are far from representing a valid, undistorted
picture of the contemporary situation in Colombia. They do not do full justice to the
nature of the regime, the intentions of the administration, the current civil-military
relationship or the distorting consequences of the presence of major drug-trafficking
groups.
Colombia would almost certainly have confronted political turmoil in the 1980s.
indeed, the language of "crisis" in speaking of the situation in Colombia preceded
analytic consideration of drug trafficking by several years. Economists may differ on
the costs and benefits of drug trafficking to Colombia, contrasting foreign exchange
and employment, on the one hand, with inflation and the consequences of a
rent-seeking mentality, on the other. But, it is difficult to argue that the consequences
of drug trafficking and of government efforts to repress it have not come at a heavy
cost to Colombian democracy, however one may wish to qualify it, and to the
possibilities of its expansion and consolidation.
How might the Colombian political regime have fared in the 1980s without the
impact of the drug trade? Politics would have been conflictive and occasionally
violent. A successful reaccommodation of the regime, in a more competitive, open
direction would not have been assured. But, the press would have felt freer and the
judiciary would be in a poor state, but not in collapse. The various complex patterns
of violence present in different cities and regions of the country may not have had
their current dimensions or even, in some cases, have been unleashed at all. Efforts
at political reincorporation might have progressed further, as those opposed to it
within the state or from traditional sectors would have been missing a critical, even if
at times only indirect, support. Guerrilla groups would have confronted a more
coherent state, perhaps better able to enforce agreements and assure the physical
integrity of political leaders, forcing them to define their own objectives more clearly,
even as the financial importance of certain remote areas under their control would
have been much less. Cynicism, corruption, resentment, the loss of trust in public
institutions, and the breakdown of social solidarity would not have reached current
heights.
Even as there is growing consciousness that if the route of reform and
incorporation is not at least partially taken, the country now appears almost
inexorably drawn into a continuing spiral of violence and of assorted polarized
struggles in different regional contexts, all complicated by the influence of the drug
trade.
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and in other countries, the cultivation of opium poppies and the production of heroin are of greater
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